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Introduction
The aim of the paper is to explore whether market forces, a dense civil society, or party competition contribute most
to the development of a plural and rich political information environment in four post-communist societies. To
achieve this goal, the paper undertakes two distinctive tasks: first, to describe the features of local media systems in
Hungary, Poland, Romania and Latvia, and secondly to explain the differences between them. Why can one find a
plural and lively local press and many popular local radio stations in one town while 30 kilometers further, another
town has virtually no local media at all? If we take seriously the assumption that politically well-informed citizens
contribute to the well being of democracy, the question is far from trivial.
The analysis mainly makes use of original survey data of chief executive administrators in over 2,000 localities; the
data collected pertains to local media as well as other aspects of local government and communities in the four
countries involved in the study. The survey was conducted in the framework of the Local Government Initiative’s
(Open Society Institute, Budapest) Local Government Monitoring Project in Spring 2001.
The main characteristics of local media systems explored in this study are 1) size (number of local media); 2) quality
; 3) sponsorship; and 4) estimated degree of penetration.
My attempt to identify the determinants of size, quality, sponsorship as well as degree of penetration of local media
does not postulate that these factors are entirely independent of one another. On the contrary, the concept of local
media systems suggests that they interact with one another in the formation and development process of local media
scenes. The endeavour to isolate the independent effects of these factors would be too large a task for this paper.
Therefore, after mapping out the survey results related to local media, I will attempt to identify potential patterns
connecting the four above-mentioned features. In the third section of the paper I proceed to explore the links
between the number of local media outlets and 1) local government resources; 2) political divides; 3) geographical
and social cleavages.
This paper constitutes the first steps taken towards the realization of a larger, two-phase research project seeking to
examine the relationship between local media systems and local government performance. The first phase of the
project consists in a description of local media systems in Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Romania, as well as an
assessment of their main determinants. The second phase will focus on the impact of media on the performance of
local governments.
1. A Profile of Media Systems in Hungary, Poland, Romania and Latvia
1.1 Data and hypotheses
The first task at hand is to draw a portrait of local media systems in the four countries in terms of size, quality,
sponsorship, and degree of penetration of local media. The description is largely based on the data of a survey
conducted with chief administrative officers (CAOs) in over 2000 municipalities (280 in Latvia, 557 in Romania,
580 in Poland, 646 in Hungary). The final sample size includes 2,023 valid cases. Information about local media in
the Central Eastern Europe and in the Baltics is hard to come by; official registers of media are typically incomplete,
outdated or – at least so far - unavailable. It is therefore difficult to check the reliability of the survey data or to
complement it when incomplete or missing. The questionnaire answered by CAOs included 15 questions
specifically pertaining to local media.1 Other areas covered by the questionnaire included local government staff,
projects, decision-making process, policies and political factions, as well as local political parties, local collection
action and civil society and local social life.
At this stage of the research, no explicit hypotheses are made as to the relationship between size, quality,
sponsorship and penetration of local media outlets. Rather, the general assumption is that they bear upon one another
in a significant manner. In addition, the paper sets out to test three hypotheses linking the number of local media
outlets (due to time and space constraints, this paper examines in details only this aspect of local media systems
among the four mentioned above) to the following factors: the financial resources of the local community; the
degree of citizens’ involvement in public life, whether through participation to non-governmental associations or
political parties; and the cleavages that characterize the locality (such as its ethnic make-up, geographical or income
disparities, etc.).
Financial resources of localities will be assessed by three different variables: income per capita, expenditures per
capita, and CAOs’ estimate of the percentage of unemployed people among the local working-age population. For
income and expenditures per capita, data is currently available only at the country level.2 Since richer local
governments have more resources to invest into local media, if they wish to do so (and wealthier citizens consume
more media), the starting hypothesis is that
a. Greater local government wealth is expected to be associated with a larger media scene, notably due to the
potentially higher number of local government-sponsored outlets.
Political divides, thought not always, often concretize into the formation of political parties and of various citizens’
associations. The presence of both parties and NGOs is likely to lead to a livelier and more diverse media scene as a
greater number of political actors contend for the favor of voters, as well as various associations get involved in
local public life. Therefore,
b. A larger number of political parties and active NGOs is expected to be associated with a greater number of local
media outlets.
The variables assessing political divides are the number of political parties, the number of active NGOs as well as
the number of active ethnic NGOs. (The latter variable is related to both the number of NGOs and the ethnic
cleavage considerer in the discussion of the third hypothesis.)
Geographical and social cleavages within communities, the most prominent probably being the presence of
minorities, also have the potential to bear on the size of the local media scene. The hypothesis following from this
consideration is that
c. The presence of social or economic divides within a community, especially a cleavage defined along the lines of
ethnicity (even if its does not translate into interests articulated by a political party), should increase the number
of local media outlets.
Survey data provides information about a number of cleavages; income; religious beliefs; political views; parts of
locality; urban/rural; ethnic origins and long-time residents/new comers. The questions were formulated as to obtain
information about the tensions caused by the divides rather than about the ‘objective’ divide per se.3 While this
formulation may render the measure less precise in certain cases (e.g. ethnic cleavage) and may occult ‘non-
problematic’ divides within communities, in others it may prove useful in highlighting the most salient cleavages.
1.2 Survey data: mapping out size, quality, ownership and penetration of local media
1.2.1 Number and types of media outlets
First asked how many media cover “from time to time” public affairs in their municipalities (from none to 8 and
more), CAOs were also required to name those media and precise their type, i.e. either print, radio or television
outlets, as well as if they were distributed/broadcast in the municipality only, in the region or in the whole country.
Results displayed in Table 1. show that a large number of localities does not count any media outlets. Out of the
29,460,752 inhabitants living in the self-government units included in the survey, 7,8% do not have access to
information about local public affairs. At the other end of the spectrum, nearly 40% of the population lives in media-
rich environments, i.e. with access to 6 or more outlets.4 The number of media covering local public affairs varies
tremendously from one country to the other. On one side we find Poland and Latvia, were only 2.1% and 3.3% of
localities do not have such outlets. On the other side stand Hungary and Romania, where 45.4% and 51.1% of the
localities do no count local media.5
Table 1. Localities per number of media outlets
Media outlets
Percentage of localities (with 0, 1,
2, etc. media outlets)
Percentage of inhabitants (living in
localities with 0, 1, 2, etc. media
outlets)
None 29 (598) 8 (2,308,061)
1 17 (350) 5 (1,577,285)
2 16 (217) 9 (2,663,814)
3 12 (337) 10 (3,026,070)
4 8 (164) 10 (2,875,175)
5 9 (179) 20 (5,977,777)
6 3 (60) 8 (2,228,874)
7 2 (40) 8 (2,365,817)
8 4 (78) 22 (6,437,879)
Total 100 (2023) 100 (29,460,752)
N=2023
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-Absolute numbers of localities and inhabitants are given in parentheses.
After indicating the total number of media, respondents were asked to provide greater details about five media
outlets (or, if less, about as many as the locality counts). The questionnaire restricted itself to five outlets because a
more extensive list could have discouraged respondents and/or generated less reliable information, especially in
cities with a large number of outlets. As shown in Table 2, the press is by far the dominant local media. This is
hardly a surprising finding given that print media are less costly to set up and to operate. What is more surprising is
that local television enjoys a significantly stronger presence than local radio.
Table 2. Localities per number of media, by media types
Papers Radio stations Television stations Broadcast media
(TV + radio)
Media
outlets
Percentage of
localities
Percentage of
localities
Percentage of
localities
Percentage of
localities
0 8 (111) 64 (914) 52 (734) 39 (548)
1 34 (481) 31 (436) 42 (602) 34 (481)
2 30 (425) 5 (72) 6 (84) 21 (306)
3 20 (287) 0 (3) 0 (4) 5 (78)
4 7 (105) - 0 (1) 1 (12)
5 1 (16) - - -
Total 100 (1425) 100 (1425) 100 (1425) 100 (1425)
N=1425
-Percentage figure are rounded up.
-The absolute number of localities is given in parentheses.
Among the localities counting have at least one local media, only 7.8% do not have a paper while the proportion is
of almost 65% for radio stations and over 50% for television channels. The category of print media comprises a
range of different papers: dailies (or near-dailies, i.e. published 4, 5 or 6 times a week), weeklies, monthlies, as well
as publications coming out less frequently. Dailies dominate the print media scene; they are present in over 60% of
cities with at least one print media. Monthlies are present in almost 40% of them, weeklies in just a little under 35%.
Finally, nearly 20% localities count one or more paper published less frequently.
When there is only one media in town, in three out of four cases the outlet is a paper. By comparison, the proportion
is one out of five for electronic media. A rough pattern along the lines of ‘the more local outlets, the more
newspapers’ is readily apparent in Table 4a. In media-rich environments, the pattern weakens, of course, as there is
greater space for a diversity of media types.
Television is absent from the local media scene in 36.3% localities. Even more cities (45.2%) do not have a single
local radio station covering local public affairs. The finding is surprising, taking into account that the four countries
exhibit a higher number of radio stations than that of television channels.6 This poor showing by radio may be due
not to their sheer absence from the local media picture but to the fact that most commercial stations typically do not
carry much news, and maybe even less that is specifically devoted to local government affairs. In the case of media-
rich settlements, it may well be that the presence of radio stations could not be fully reported by respondents because
of the five-outlet limit imposed by the questionnaire’s structure. (CAOs in media-rich settlements were asked to
name the five that provide the most extensive coverage of public affairs, which gives credence to supposition that
radio air limited amount of local municipal information.)
Table 3. Number of papers by total number of media
Percentage of localities (by number of media outlets)Papers
1 outlet 2 outlets 3 outlets 4 outlets 5 outlets 6 outlets 7 outlets 8+
outlets
0 72
(23)
13
(4)
4
(2)
2
(1)
7
(5)
2
(3)
0
(0)
1
(1)
1 55
(75)
29
(43)
11
(22)
2
(5)
1
(3)
0
(0)
0
(5)
3
(18)
2 1*
(2)
38
(51)
27
(49)
18
(47)
8
(18)
2
(13)
3
(28)
4
(19)
3 0.3*
(0)
1*
(1)
22
(27)
19
(34)
29
(46)
10
(48)
5
(35)
13
(47)
4 1*
(0)
2*
(1)
1*
(0)
21
(13)
36
(21)
19
(33)
11
(30)
9
(12)
5 75
(7)
6
(2)
6
(3)
13
(3)
N=1425
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-The first percentage figures give the percentage of localities within the number of papers categories (rows). Figures
in parentheses indicate the percentage of localities within number of outlets categories (columns).
* Logically inconsistent answers provided by respondents.
Table 4. Localities per number of broadcast media outlets
Percentage of localities (by number of media outlets)Broad-
cast
outlets
1 outlet 2 outlets 3 outlets 4 outlets 5 outlets 6 outlets 7 outlets 8+
outlets
0 51
(79)
29
(49)
11
(26)
4
(14)
4
(11)
0
(3)
0
(3)
1
(8)
1 14
(21)
31
(47)
24
(49)
11
(33)
9
(24)
4
(35)
3
(33)
3
(17)
2 3.9
(4)
19
(25)
24
(45)
27
(45)
9
(47)
4
(33)
13
(51)
3 1.3
(0)
14
(7)
42
(18)
10
(13)
14
(28)
18
(18)
4 8
(1)
25
(2)
8
(2)
17
(5)
42
(6)
N=1425
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-The first percentage figures give the percentage of localities within the number of papers categories (rows). Figures
in parentheses indicate the percentage of localities within number of outlets categories (columns).
As data included in previous tables illustrates, the size of a city and the number of media outlets covering municipal
affairs are not unrelated (see Table 14 for pooled data and country-specific coefficients.) The correlation goes some
way in explaining the variations we find in terms of number of media outlets between localities, but certainly does
not tell the whole story. Figure 1 (not shown here) illustrates that there are considerable variations between towns of
similar population size with respect to the size of their media scene. The number of all three types of media – papers,
radio and television - are significantly and positively related to population size. The number of print media, as
expected, exhibits the weakest relationship (r = .177); broadcast media make for a stronger link (r = .324). Thus we
expect some other elements of influence to unfold (potentially) more clearly in the case of print local media with
respect to various aspects of the local environment.
1.2.2 Ownership and control
Respondents were asked to identify the owner of local media among the following list items: the local government
or a company owned by the local government; another government (regional or national) or a company owned by
this government; a local public institution; a political party; a NGO(s), a business enterprise(s), private citizens or
‘others’. CAOs also had the possibility to indicate that they did not know.7
We find that in over 40% of localities, the local government owns at least one local media outlet. Private citizens
and business enterprises come relatively close behind with a presence in a little over 30% of local media scenes.
Other owners come far behind, none of them achieving ownership in 10% of localities. By law, political parties are
not allowed to own broadcast media in Latvia8; elsewhere political parties own outlets in only a handful of localities,
mostly in Poland (5.8%).9 At the country level, the ownership picture is varied. In Hungary and Latvia, local
governments are strong sponsors of media, owning at least one outlet in 78.1% and 63% of localities where there are
local media. The contrast is sharp with Romania, where only 9.6% of localities count local government-owned
media. Poland comes in the middle with local government media present in 26.6% of localities. The proportion of
private media, owned either by enterprises or private citizens, stands between 40% (Hungary) and 65% (Poland).
Poland offers the most diverse range of owners, notably with a significant presence of public institutions (18.2%)
and ‘other owners’ (14.6%) as sponsors of media outlets.
Table 5. Localities per number of media outlets and types of owners – all countries
Percentage of localities by owners of local media
Local
governm
ent
Other
governm
ent
Local
Institution
(s)
Politica
l party
NGO(s) Busines
s
Private
citizen(s
)
Other Don’t
knowOut-
lets
Localitie
s %
% % % % % % % %
0 58
(825)
90
(1285)
91
(1302)
98
(1388)
96
(1362)
69
(978)
69
(984)
93
(1323)
75
(1063)
1 36 (519) 6 (91) 6 (79) 2 (32) 3 (46) 16
(229)
15
(209)
5 (65) 9 (128)
2 5 (74) 2 (31) 2 (21) 0 (5) 1 (13) 8 (111) 8 (113) 2 (23) 7 (103)
3 0 (2) 1 (13) 2 (11) - 0 (3) 4 (51) 5 (71) 1 (8) 5 (69)
4 0 (3) 0 (3) 1 (10) - 0 (1) 2 (33) 3 (35) 0 (2) 2 (32)
5 0 (2) 0 (2) 0 (2) - - 1 (23) 1 (13) 0 (4) 2 (30)
N=1425
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
More simply, localities can be qualified according to the ownership position of the local government – whether it
enjoys an effective monopoly on public affairs news or not. Table 5 already shows that in 57.9% of cases, the local
government does not own any outlet. By contrast, it constitutes the sole provider of news about local public affairs
in 16.4% of localities with one or more local media. (We have to bear in mind that there remains 25.4% localities
where there is at least one media for which we do not have ownership information.) By comparison, other owners
such as enterprises and private citizens control the only outlet in town in only 7.8% and 5.5% localities
respectively.10 This indicates that privately owned media tend to be found concentrated in bigger, more profitable
markets rather than isolated. This is confirmed by a significant negative relationship between population size and the
number of local government media on the one hand (r = -.037) and a significant positive one between population
size and privately owned media (either by enterprises or individuals) on the other (r = .299). Finally, others owners
are monopolists in rare occasions only: regional and central governments, or companies they own, in 1.4% of
localities with at least one media; so are public institutions; NGOs, in 1% of localities; ‘other owners’ in 0.7% and,
finally, political parties in only 0.2% of cases.
Direct subsidies or advertisement revenues paid by the local government and from which the media depends on to
maintain its activities can prove as effective as ownership as a means of control. CAOs were asked to which extent
each media outlet depends on such subsidies and/or revenues to survive. Superposing the picture of a distribution of
heavily subsidized media with the size of local media scenes, we first find that such media are monopolists in 9.7%
of localities with at least one media. In all these towns save 11, heavily subsidized media are already owned by the
local government. Therefore, the local media scene is under direct (ownership) or indirect (via subsidies) control of
the local government in a total of 17.1% of localities with one of more outlets.
The portrait of ownership types diversity can also be refined. The categories ‘business enterprises’ and ‘private
citizens’ are lumped together to become simply ‘private’ owners. Assigning a value of ‘1’ to each different type of
media owner and computing the total, we find that, among the 1075 localities (53.1% of the sample) with at least
two media outlets, less than half (47.9%) boast more than one type of owner. Of course, the combined category of
‘private’ media is very likely to comprise owners who are not the same person or business. Unfortunately, the
available data does not allow to discriminate further within the category of private owners. As a consequence,
assessing chain ownership, which is frequent in the regional press sector, and its (potential) effects on local
government performance cannot be done based solely on the CAOs survey data.
1.2.3 Quantity and Quality
For print media, quantity of coverage about local public affairs is measured by the number of pages devoted to local
public affairs. CAOs’ estimate for each media were added up to obtain a total number of pages of coverage in each
locality. In a number of cities, quantity-related information is missing for one, two, or even all media outlets. To
avoid underestimating the quantity of information about public information available in those towns, the number of
media has been adjusted to match the number of outlets about which we possess information. Table 6 below
illustrates how many pages, first in absolute number, then divided by the number of outlets for which we have
information, concern local public affairs.
Table 6. Localities according to the number of pages devoted to local public affairs in average issues of local papers
Percentage of localitiesNumber of pages
Absolute number of pages Average number of pages
Less than a full page 28 35
1 to 3 24 28
4 to 6 17 18
7 to 9 20 6
10 + 11 13
Total 100 100
N=1153
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
For electronic media, the frequency of reports was used as a unit of measurement, ranging from ‘1 - a few times a
year’ to ‘6 - more than one hour per week’. Information about the frequency of reports about public affairs
broadcast/aired by electronic media, complete or partial, is available in most cities counting such outlets. The ordinal
categories, from 1 to 6, were treated as real values and computed to rank localities according to the average
frequency of coverage by electronic media (i.e. absolute frequency score divided by the number of electronic media
outlets we have information about).
Table 7. Average frequency of reports on local public affairs by electronic media
Average frequency of reports (score) Percentage of
localities
Infrequent (0 to 2.99) 49
Relatively infrequent (3 to 4.99) 24
Relatively frequent (5 to 5.99) 14
Frequent (6) 13
Total 100
N=860
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
Tables 6 and 7 indicate that, in general, print media provide more information about municipal affairs than
electronic media.
Quantity is obviously not everything. The language and style used, the variety of topics covered, the depth of articles
or reports, the incisiveness of editorial comments, all contribute to the quality. Concepts such as fairness, lack of
bias, good faith and credibility, intricately linked to the former elements, also matter (McQuail 1992, 211-2). Quality
is a concept that does not translate easily into quantitative terms. Most attempts to assess quality in a quantifiable
manner have made use of content analysis. For example, the proportion of local content of a news report or of a
newspaper is a measure oft used by students of local media. Others have used other indicators such as the number of
own news-gathering staff (McQuail, 1992, 268), the size of editorial budget or the workload of journalists (defined
as the number or articles or news pieces produced per day) (Riffe and Shaw 1990; Lacy and Fico 1990). In the case
of newspaper with relatively large circulation, a rule of thumb has been to rely on a ratio of editorial staff/circulation
(Johnstone, Slawski and Bowman 1976; Turner 1995). In this paper, since neither content analysis-based measures
nor information pertaining to the number of journalists employed, editorial budget or circulation numbers are
available, quality is measured by the presence/absence of four elements from local media outlets’ regular coverage:
1) reports about local assembly’s decisions; 2) reports about proposals debated the assembly; 3) reports about
arguments and counterarguments discussed at local assemblies; 4) interviews with local government leaders or
councilors.
The significant differences between the attention given to the four elements are illustrated in Table 8. While
interviews with local leaders and reports about local assembly’s decisions are absent from local media’s coverage in
less than 20% of localities, information about arguments and counterarguments raised during local assembly’s
debates, as well as about proposals to be debated, are missing in 35.7% and 47.7% of cases. The pattern is consistent
in all four countries. This points to the potential (only content analysis could confirm it) superficiality of coverage of
municipal affairs, with a tendency to focus on personalities (e.g. featuring interviews) and on faits accomplis
(coverage of decisions) rather than on reports about issues and arguments at a time when it could provide citizens
with greater opportunity to actively participate to the exchange of ideas and the policy-making process (that is,
before proposals are debated and decided upon by the local assembly members).
Table 8. Individual quality measures of local media outlets’ coverage
Absence of reports about: Localities (%)
Interviews with local leaders/councilors 14
Decisions of local assembly 18
Arguments and counterarguments raised by local
assembly
36
Proposals before they are debated 48
N=1421, except for interviews N=1422.
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
An index of quality of media coverage of local public affairs is computed and illustrated in Table 9. The absolute
score column shows scores achieved in all cities by all the media for which quality-related information is available.
In 6.5% of cases, none of the four elements are covered. The average score takes into account the number of outlets
available in town, up to a maximum of five. It shows that in over 12% of localities coverage’s quality is low, while
media in 14% localities achieve the highest possible score, indicating that all elements of quality are present in all
the outlets.
Table 9. Quality of coverage index – all media outlets
Quality index Absolute score
(0-20)
Localities Average score (0-
4)
Localities
Low quality 0 7 (92) Less than 1 12 (172)
Low-medium 1-5 42 (596) 1 to 1.99 22 (304)
Medium 6-10 30 (420) 2 to 2.99 27 (383)
Medium-high 11-15 14 (200) 3 to 3.99 25 (354)
High 16-20 7 (103) 4 14 (198)
Total 100 (1411) 100 (1411)
N=1411
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-The absolute number of localities is given in parenthesis.
-14 cases are excluded besides those localities where there are no media: in 3 occurrences there is no information
pertaining to quality and in 11 cases, we have information about more outlets than the number reported by CAOs.
According to common wisdom, television’s content exhibits lesser quality in general (i.e. is less informative) than
print media because of its tendency to seek out sensational images and reliance on ‘sound bytes’. However, the
various studies that tested this hypothesis came to mixed results.11 Table 10 and 11 illustrate the scores obtained by
print and broadcast media separately. Because the maximum number of broadcast outlets we find in one city is
lower that than of papers, the absolute scales in Tables 10 and 11 are different. However, the average scores present
quality performance in comparable terms; they show that the difference between the quality of local public affairs’
coverage of print and electronic outlets is relatively small. The better performance of papers over broadcast media
might be an indicator that localities endowed with a larger number of papers enjoy higher quality coverage.
However, it is also important to keep in mind that a significant number of papers – in 42.5% of places where we find
print outlets - are owned by local government. To find out that those papers feature more abundant reports about the
local assembly’s debates or interview with councilors is therefore hardly surprising. Another factor related to local
government ownership susceptible to contribute to the better quality performance of newspapers’ coverage is the
fact that CAOs are employed by local governments and may view the local government-owned papers in a more
positive light than other publications. Only a second, independent (i.e. not related to local governments) report or
source of information would allow to determine if and to which extent the observed difference between the two
quality scores reflects reality and/or the respondents’ bias.
Table 10. Quality index of print media coverage
Quality index of
print media
Absolute score
(0-20)
Percentage of
localities
Average score (0-
4)
Percentage of
localities
Low quality 0 8 (110) Less than 1 11 (148)
Low-medium 1-5 53 (692) 1 to 1.99 16 (206)
Medium 6-10 30 (397) 2 to 2.99 26 (338)
Medium-high 11-15 8 (99) 3 to 3.99 28 (375)
High 16-20 1 (15) 4 19 (246)
Total 100 (1313) 100 (1313)
N=1313
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-In addition to localities without paper, one case has been excluded due to missing information.
-The absolute number of localities is given in parenthesis.
Table 11. Quality index of broadcast media coverage
Quality index of
broadcast media
Absolute score (0-
16)
Localities Average score (0-4) Localities
Low quality 0 11 (97) Less than 1 14 (125)
Low-medium 1-4 67 (583) 1 to 1.99 26 (232)
Medium 5-8 18 (158) 2 to 2.99 23 (198)
Medium-high 9-12 4 (38) 3 to 3.99 21 (181)
High 13-16 0 (1) 4 16 (141)
Total 100 (1146) 100 (1146)
N=1146
-Percentage figures are rounded up.
-The absolute number of localities is given in parenthesis.
1.2.4 Penetration
Penetration for each city is calculated using CAOs’ estimates of the audience reached by each media outlet, ranging
on a scale from 0 (‘less than one person out of 10’) to 10 (‘almost everyone’). Adding up and dividing the estimates
by the number of media (up to five), we obtain an average penetration score.
Table12. Localities per average penetration of media – all, print and broadcast outlets
All outlets Print Broadcast
Average penetration
(score)
Percentage of
localities
Percentage of
localities
Percentage of
localities
Very low (0 to 0.99) 3 5 5
Low (1 to 3.99) 30 33 26
Average (4 to 6.99) 42 37 40
High (7 to 9.99) 19 17 22
Very high (10) 6 8 7
Total 100 N=1387* 100
N=1307
100
N=870
-Percentage figures have been rounded up.
-Percentage figures have been rounded up.
*In addition to the localities where no penetration-related information was available, 11 cases were also discarded in
the ‘all media’ column due to incoherent coding.
The withdrawal of 11 cases from the analysis due to coding incoherence may explain why we obtain an average
‘very low’ score which is lower for all media than for print or broadcast media considered separately. We note that
the difference between the penetration index scores for print and broadcast is more marked than for the quantity and
quality index scores. Results indicate that broadcast media reach a bigger audience than papers.
2. Assessing the links between characteristics of local media systems
As indicated in the introduction of this paper, this section does not attempt to establish if, for example, the quality of
coverage determines penetration, or the size of the local media scene, its quality. Neither does it seek to isolate the
effect of one variable on the other. Rather, the coefficients given below are indicators of the strength of the
relationship between pairs of variables. Note that the number of cases pertaining to each variable is given in the
boxes, below the Pearson’s r values. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that the data could not yet be
weighted as to compensate for the inclusion of a greater number of bigger cities in the sample with respect to their
proportion in reality.12
Table 13. Correlations between elements of local media systems
Size Quality Local government
Ownership
Quality -.034 (.043)
1411
Local government
ownership
-.085** (0.82)
1425
.201** (.050)
1411
Penetration -.247** (.057)
1387
.158** (.020)
1379
.220** (.037)
1387
?  p<.05 ** p<.01
-Number of cases given in boxes for each variable.
The coefficients reported in Table 13 tell us that quality (defined as the presence of coverage of decisions, proposals,
arguments related to local policy debates as well as interviews with local authorities’ leaders) tends to go down as
the number of media increases. However, the correlation between the two variables is not significant. The direction
of the relationship suggests that competition, here minimally defined as the number of media available in a locality,
does not play its ‘expected’ role of fostering quality via engaging outlets into a contest for audiences, luring them
with higher quality content.13
Local government ownership of media is negatively associated with the presence of a larger number of media. This
is not surprising given the previous observation (see section 1.2.2) that privately owned media (either by business
enterprises or individuals) are more numerous in bigger cities. Consequently with the above-mentioned explanation
on the effects of competition, quality and local government ownership are also positively and significantly related.
Penetration is negatively correlated to size: this suggests that in certain localities, media do not have to ‘share’ the
audience between themselves to the same extent as in places were more media are available. People consume only
so many media, and a selection process is at work above a certain limit. Penetration is also positively correlated to
both quality and local government ownership, the relationship with the latter being stronger than with the former
variable. Again, the finding is coherent with the remarks already made about quality, competition and local
government ownership.
The overall picture outlined in Table 13 is that localities with less media tend to witness greater local government
involved in media ownership. The quality of the outlets’ coverage of municipal affairs is also higher and on average
reach a larger number of people than their counterparts in localities endowed with larger local media scene.
Therefore, local media systems are not affected by market forces in the way supposed by the economic model of
demand for news, which posits that competition increases both penetration and content quality. On the contrary,
local government-owned media in smaller markets, not infrequently in the position of sole provider(s) of
information about local public affairs in town, seem to fare better.
3. Assessing the link between local government resources, civil society, socio-
political divides and the size of local media scene
After examining the relationship between ‘intra-media system’ variables, the third section of the paper considers the
relationship between ‘extra-media system’ factors and the number of local media outlets citizens have access to. As
already mentioned in the first section, the following paragraphs focus solely on the size of local media scenes as the
dependent variable. The hypotheses to be tested are the following:
a. Greater local government wealth is expected to be associated with a larger media scene, notably due to the
potentially higher number of local government-sponsored outlets;
b. A larger number of political parties and active NGOs is expected to be associated with a greater number of local
media outlets;
d. The presence of social or economic divides within a community, especially a cleavage defined along the lines of
ethnicity (even if its does not translate into interests articulated by a political party), should increase the number
of local media outlets.
Table 14 contains coefficients illustrating the strength of the relationship between the number of media and ‘extra-
media systems’ factors, when population size is controlled for. As in Table 13, the number of cases is provided in
each box. ‘NA’ means that the question was not asked in the country or, as for the budget-based variables, that
pooled data could not be analyzed yet. It is also important to bear in mind that, at this point in time, data could not
be weighted. The coefficients shown in Table 14 are standardized betas.
Table 14. Partial correlations between number of media and financial resources, political divide and cleavages,
population size controlled for.
Pooled data
set
Latvia Hungary Poland Romania
Population size .410** (.000)
2023
.378** (.000)
241
.719** (.000)
646
.304** (.000)
579
.476** (.000)
557
# of settlements
in the
municipality
(Hungary excl.)
.220** (.000)
1348
.048 (.432)
238
NA -.107**(.009)
564
-.004 (.924)
546
% Commuters -.118**
(.000) 1995
-.002 (.970)
241
-.095**
(.001) 646
.042 (.309)
551
-.028 (.454)
557
Locality’s
income per
capita
N/A .075 (.214)
238
.032 (.230)
626
.018 (.662)
571
.067 (.089)
536
Locality’s exp.
per capita
N/A .050 (.411)
241
.036 (.170)
629
.065 (.108)
571
.034 (.367)
528
% Unemployed -.130**
(.000) 1930
.012 (.839)
241
-.116**
(.000) 591
-.115**(.007)
566
.061 (.098)
532
Political parties .186** (.000)
2023
.023 (.722)
241
.447** (.000)
646
.226** (.000)
579
.278** (.000)
557
Number of
active NGOs
.232** (.000)
1998
.051 (.509)
241
.469** (.000)
645
.239* (.000)
555
.225** (.000)
557
Number of
active ethnic
NGOs (Poland
excl.)
.090** (.000)
1354
-.092 (.490)
152
.126** (.001)
645
NA .102** (.007)
557
Cleavages
causing tensions:
Income
.115** (.000)
1963
.144* (.016)
241
.024 (.381)
631
-.026 (.518)
575
.067** (.076)
51
Religious beliefs .078** (.000)
1911
.128* (.033)
241
-.012 (.683)
626
.061 (.126)
567
.079* (.041)
477
Political views .198**
(.000)1941
.080 (.188)
240
.115** (.000)
625
.061 (.121)
572
-.052 (.176)
504
Parts of locality .204** (.000)
1894
.168* (.021)
241
.087** (.002)
625
.018 (.656)
567
.077 (.053)
461
Urban/rural
(only LV & PL)
N/A .224** (.000)
240
N/A .101* (.011)
557
N/A
Ethnic origins -.117**
(.000) 1890
.059 (.326)
241
.036 (.198)
628
.081* (.048)
557
.087* (.028)
464
‘Old’ residents
/newcomers
-.060**
(.006) 1877
.076 (.206)
240
-.002 (.945)
624
.036 (.371)
559
.004 (.924)
454
p<.05 ** p<.01
-The level of significance for each coefficient is indicated in parentheses.
3.1 Population size, number of settlements and commuters
As expected, population size is significantly related to the size of local media scenes. The coefficient is particularly
high in Hungary. This could be due to the structure of the local government system in that country. The level of
amalgamation/fragmentation is the extent to which settlements, villages, are grouped together in a self-governing
entity. Amalgamation is quasi non-existent in Hungary: nearly every settlement, regardless of its size, has its own
self-government. Therefore, Hungary counts a large number of small self-government units with low population,
which causes the exceptionally strong link between population size and the number of media. Amalgamation is
moderate in Latvia, and important in Poland and Romania.
However, the coefficients of the variable measuring the number of settlements in the localities surveyed indicate that
the relationship between the number of settlements and the number of media is not straightforward. In the case of
Poland, a greater number of distinct settlements is associated with less rather than more media. The relationship is
also negative in Romania, albeit barely so. The explanation could have to do with the identity of the settlements (not
strong enough to foster the appearance of media outlets) or/and the fact that even highly amalgamated local
governments units in Poland count significantly less inhabitants than those which are not amalgamated (and thus
less able to support a larger media scene).
Table 14 also includes a variable taking into account the percentage of commuters. It can be related to other
variables used by scholars whose work aimed to assess the link between the degree to which individuals are
‘attached’ to their communities (“community ties”, operationalized by length of residence, voting in local elections,
membership in local associations, etc.) and their local media consumption behavior.14 It could be argued that people
who commute everyday to earn a living (and spend most of it) elsewhere than in the locality where they live are less
likely to consume local media. Thus a high percentage of commuters would (indirectly, via a lesser demand) depress
the size of the local media scene. Another, very different hypothesis holds that a large number of commuters
constitutes an indicator of the (sub)urban nature of a settlement. Located in the vicinity of a larger urban center, such
localities could see their local media scene ‘drowned’ by competition. Depending on the nature of the coverage of
the major centers’ media (whether it includes reports about the local political life of a wider neighborhood or not), a
large number of commuters can be associated either with a smaller or greater size of the local media scene.
Coefficients in Table 14 send mixed signals; they are negative in three countries (including in Hungary, the only
place where it is also significant) but positive in Poland. Because its very definition takes into account the
population size, the percentage of commuters variable also raises the issue of multicollinearity. Therefore, in the
absence of other variables capturing the rural/urban character of towns, or the strength of community ties in them,
such results remain difficult to interpret.
3.2 Financial resources
The three measures of localities’ resources – income per capita, expenditure per capital and the percentage of
unemployed as estimated by the CAOs – yield results that tend to support our first hypothesis, but to a moderate
extent only. While all correlations are positive, none of the coefficients are significant. Furthermore, correlations
between income and expenditure per capita on the one hand and local government ownership of media outlets on the
other (results not shown in Table 14) are not significant in any of the four countries, and their direction does not
follow any visible pattern. While pooled data could not be analyzed for those two measures, preliminary results
indicate that the number of local media reporting about local public affairs may have relatively little to do with the
financial resources of the community.
The third measure of wealth, the percentage of unemployed people, concurs with the hypothesis according to which
richer localities have more media in the case of Hungary and Poland (as does results for the pooled analysis). There,
a higher rate of unemployment is significantly associated with less media outlets. In Latvia and Romania the
coefficients exhibit a positive sign but are not significant. The difference between the scores of local government
budget-related variables and unemployment may be related to the nature of local government finance system of each
country. Where local government expenditures as a percentage of the country’s GDP are comparatively higher, or
where central government transfers play a significant role in local government’s budget along with local or shared
taxes,15 the income or expenditures measures can mask the true level of resources of the community and its ability to
support a larger number of media, either directly or via the advertisement market it has. In the future, more
effectively tailored measures will have to explore the relationship between communities’ financial resources and
local media.
3.3 Political parties and civil society
In spite of the fact that neither political parties nor NGOs are major sponsors of media, the presence of both is
significantly associated with a higher number of media (except in Latvia, where the correlation is also positive but
does not reach significance level). The relationships are particularly strong in Hungary, which has boasted one of the
most stable party systems among post-communist societies. We also see that the number of NGOs and the number
of ethnic minorities’ NGOs variables follow a similar pattern (Latvia being again the exception), with the latter’s
coefficients systematically lower than for the total number of NGOs. (Unfortunately, the number of ethnic NGOs is
missing from the Polish survey data.) The strength of the relationship between the number of NGOs and number of
media in Hungary points to particularly lively civil society, actively engaged in public life.
3.4 Cleavages
The last group of variables pertains to cleavages susceptible to be associated, to various degrees, with larger
numbers of media outlets. At this exploratory stage, they were not aggregated into an index in order not to obscure
their (potentially) specific relationship with the size of the local media scene.
Rather unsurprisingly, divisions between different parts of localities are positively related to the number of media in
all countries, and significantly so in Latvia and Hungary. The only other cleavage- related variable exhibiting a
systematic relationship with the number of local media is the urban/rural cleavage. Tensions between urban and
rural dwellers are associated with a larger number of outlets. However, as this question was asked in only two
countries, the conclusions we can draw - other than to say that the area merits further investigation – are limited.
The case of the income cleavage is somewhat less clear. While the R square value is positive in three countries,
furthermore significant in Latvia and Romania, it is negative in Poland. The political orientation cleavage
coefficients do not exhibit a clear pattern either, with only one correlation reaching significance level, and a negative
relationship in the case of Romania. This puzzling result maybe be indicative that the latter variable taps into a
different source than the number of political parties variable, in spite of the relatively strong showing of the
Hungarian coefficient. The variables measuring religious beliefs and old residents/newcomers cleavages present
ambiguous pattern with three countries with positive coefficients, and one with a negative sign. None of the
coefficients related to the old/residents/ newcomers variable reach significance level, while results are moderately
significant in two countries for the religious beliefs measure.
Lastly, the presence of tensions due to an ethnic cleavage is associated with more local media outlets at the country
level. (The negative sign of the coefficient of the pooled data set is probably an effect of the lower salience of the
cleavage in countries where there are many local outlets). However, the relationship is not as strong as expected,
especially in Hungary and Romania, where the number of ethnic NGOs was positively and significantly related to
the number of media. An explanation could be that tensions between ethnic groups, notably in Hungary and in
Romania, are associated with the presence of a Roma minority, which could constitute an indirect measure of the
community’s financial situation. Since localities with a higher percentage of Roma population are generally poorer
than average (and count more illiterate people), it would be logical to see the expected effects of the ethnic cleavage
on the number of media dampened. However, the fact that the coefficient is positive and significant in the case of
Poland as well indicates that the explanation is not sufficient. Further demographic data such as the percentage of
minority population at the local level would permit a more accurate assessment of the relationship between the
presence of minorities and the size of local media scene.
3.5 Assessing the respective roles of political divides, financial resources and cleavages
One way to measure the relative role played by the variables included in Table 14 is to include them into a
multivariate regression equation with the number of local media outlets as the dependent variable. The goal is not to
establish causal links between the variables and the size of local media scene, nor to restrict the number of factors
related to the latter to the range of those already laid out in Table 14. Rather, the multivariate regression technique is
used here as a tool to further investigate the data at hand (the regression is performed with the pooled data set only,
not at the country level).
Two conditions are set up to determine the variables included in the equation. Firstly, only the variables with R
square value above 0.1 are retained. Secondly, to maximize the number of cases considered, variables that are not
available for all four countries are discarded. This leaves us with nine variables: population size; political parties;
number of NGOs; percentage of unemployed; income cleavage; political cleavage; parts of localities cleavage,
ethnic origin cleavage and the percentage of commuters. Dummy variables are also included to account for the
country in which the towns are located, for a total of 12 variables included in the equation.
Table 15. Multivariate regression of size of local media scene
Variables Standardized Beta
Number of active NGOs .180** (.000)
Population size .177** (.000)
Number of political parties .167** (.000)
Different parts of municipality .049** (.007)
% of unemployed -.043* (.033)
Ethnic cleavage .035 (.067)
Income cleavage .025 (.179)
Political orientation cleavage -.019 (.319)
% of commuters -.003 (.870)
Latvia .250** (.000)
Hungary -.107** (.000)
Poland .490** (.000)
R square of the equation = .540
N=1718
* p<.05 ** p<.01
-The level of significance of each coefficient is indicated in parentheses.
The equation yields a R square value of .540 and includes 1718 cases – 85% of the localities included in the sample.
Those findings give only cautious, preliminary support to hypothesis a., positing that wealthier communities can
‘afford’ a larger number of local outlets. Unemployment, the only among the three measures used in this study to
assess localities’ financial resources to be introduced into the equation, exhibits a significant (albeit not very strong),
negative relationship with the dependent variable.
Hypothesis b states that the presence of political parties and NGOs is associated with a greater number of media
reporting on municipal affairs. In spite of the fact that neither parties nor NGOs constitute significant sponsors of
outlets, the hypothesis finds confident support in the study’s results. Along with population size, the two variables
exhibit the highest coefficients presented in Table 15.
Hypothesis c., according to which cleavages foster larger local media scene, is only partly supported. Geographical
divisions (between different neighborhoods of municipalities) are significantly and positively related to the number
of media. The variable accounting for an ethnic divide did not turn out significant (however the direction of the
relationship is, as expected, positive). Other cleavages included in the regression equation did not yield significant
results; divisions rooted in diverging political orientations, unlike the presence of political parties, even yielded a
negative coefficient.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides the quantitative, comparative insights into the field of regional and local media in Latvia,
Hungary, Romania and Poland. Drawing on data gathered during a survey conducted with chief administrative
officers in over 2,000 municipalities, the first section described significant differences between the local media
scenes of the four countries involved in the study. It highlighted that, while practically half of localities in Hungary
and Romania do not have any local media providing information about local public affairs, the large majority of
Latvian and Polish towns count at least one local media outlet.
Local government themselves are sponsoring a significant part of the media scene, notably in Hungary and Latvia,
and to lesser extent in Poland. In the latter country, as well as in Romania, survey data indicates that private owners,
either enterprises or individual citizens, sponsor most of the available outlets. The paper also tackled the issue of
quality and penetration of local media. The first was defined by assessing whether local print and broadcast media
carried information (at least occasionally) about debates (proposals and arguments) and decisions made by local
assemblies; another element of quality was defined by the inclusion of interviews with local representatives in the
outlets’ coverage. The results of pooled analysis show that most outlets provide citizens with average or above
average quality coverage; CAOs’ evaluation also suggests that print media provide slightly better coverage of local
public life than their electronic counterparts. As for average penetration at the aggregate level, survey data
demonstrate the relative success of local outlets, with most broadcast media reaching a larger audience than
newspapers.
A correlation matrix of the four main features described in the first part of the paper, namely size, sponsorship,
quality and penetration, confirms the initial supposition that they constitute a web of interrelated elements. Local
government-owned media outlets tend to be more prominent in smaller local media scenes, and also tend to exhibit
higher quality coverage and achieve greater reach than their (mostly) privately owned counterparts.
The third part of the paper explored the relationship between the number of local media outlets and various ‘extra-
media’ variables measuring communities’ financial resources, potential political divides as well as other cleavages,
mainly social and geographical. The hypothesis according to which wealthier communities have a larger number of
outlets readily available is supported, but to a limited extent only. The available measures need to be further refined
before the initial, still partial results obtained thus far can be confirmed.
The number of political parties and the number of NGOs, both assessing the depth of political divides susceptible to
foster larger number of media, were systematically and significantly associated with the presence of a larger number
of media.
The last group of variables considered in this paper comprised seven cleavages, all expected to be associated with a
greater number of media. Among them, income differences, as well as political orientations, parts of locality and
ethnic origins yielded significant coefficients above 0.1 at the pooled level, without however always being related in
a systematic way to the dependent variable across the four countries.
The final step aimed at determining the relative strength of the relationship between the ‘non-media’ variables and
the number of local media outlets, while controlling for the population size. Five out of the nine coefficients
obtained are significant. They show that the number of active NGOs, population size, and the number of local
parties are significantly connected to the size of local media scene, followed by a cleavage between the various parts
of a locality and the rate of unemployment.
Obviously, this comparative outline of local media systems in Latvia, Hungary, Poland and Romania has yet to be
turned into a full picture. Once this will be done, the available survey data (complemented with further information
such as the proportion of minority within the population, local elections turnout, etc.) will have the potential to yield
a rich account of the relationship between local media and the state of local democracy in the region. Exploiting this
potential will be the task of the second phase of the project this study is a part of.
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Footnotes
1) The complete questionnaire is available on the website of Tocqueville Research Center (http://www.t-rc.org)
2) Depending on access to data opportunities, pooled data might be avaliable by the time of the conference.
3) The exact wording of the question was the following: "To what extent to the following differences cause social
tensions between people in your community? Please answer with the help of the 7-point scale where 1 refers to very
little tension and 7, very high tension. a) Differences in income; b) differences in religious beliefs or affiliation; c)
differences in political views; d) differences between parts of the municipality; e) differences in ethnic (or racial)
origins; f) differences between parts of the municipality; g) differences between people who always lived here and
those who moved here only recently."
4) Throughout the paper I use the terms 'local media' for the sake of convenience but all questions referred to media
outlets which provide information about local public affairs.
5) Tables with complete individual country results are not always included in this draft but will be available at the
workshop. Unless otherwise specified, descriptions apply to the pooled data set.
6) For example in Romania, according to the Statistical Yearbook 2000, there were 331 radio stations and 153
television stations in 1999.
7) The question was not asked for media outlets previously identified as national media. This significantly affects
the number of media on which we have ownership information only in Latvia and in Poland.
8) See CIT (2001), Latvia.
9) This does not mean that political parties do not publish local papers. Competition is particularly fierce in some
districts of Budapest where major parties provide readers/voters with small newspapers after the model of the local
government paper.
10) Readers have to keep in mind that the categories such as 'private enterprises' or private citizens\rquote are likely
to comprise more than one company or different citizens as owners.
11) According to Robinson and Levy (1984), there was no significant difference between how much regular and
irregular television news watchers learned about issues positions of candidates, but they found that regular
newspapers readers were learning more than irregular readers by a margin of 2 to 1. Another study (Price and Zaller,
1990) redeemed the image of television by coming to the conclusion that people could retain or remember more
information by watching television rather than by reading newspapers.
12) Depending on data access, if weights become available before the conference, they will be applied to present
updated results.
13) See Lacy (1989) for an outline of a model of demand for media explaining why competition yields higher
quality. The notion of competition currently used in this paper requires much refining. Competition can be divided
into two specific aspects: extra-local system competition (competition from national publications, channels and
stations), and intra-local system competition (competition between local media outlets). To a great extent, intra-
system competition is endogenous to local media systems. The two ty pes of competition would not be expected to
associate with size and quality in the same way. Higher extra-system competition would be hypothesized to yield a
smaller number of local media achieving lesser penetration; greater intra-system competition would be expected to
correlate with higher content quality and higher penetration. (With respect to quality, the effects of competition have
been investigated by a number of studies. Most of them find that competition has little or no effect on papers\rquote
content. Rarrick and Hartman (1966, reported in Entman 1989, 93) found competition to be associated with more
local news. More recently, findings showed that cross-ownership of television stations is related to more local
programming, while concentration meant les s overall local programs but more local news and public affairs.
Furthermore, locally owned newspapers covered better local controversies but chain-owned publications were more
inclined to take position on local issues in their editorial pages (see Picard 1989, 80). Necessary details about the
identity of each media outlets identified by CAOs are yet to be obtained to construct differentiated competition
indexes for three countries, i.e. Hungary, Poland and Romania. However, the data will not allow to fully account f or
concentration, cross-ownership and local/chain-ownership.
14) Morris Janowitz was the first to examine the relationship closely in his classic 1952 book. He has been followed
by many: among others, see K. R Stamm and L Fortini-Campbell (1983); Jeffres, Dobos and Jae-won Lee (1988);
Emig (1995); McLeod et al. (1996).
15) See Horvath 2000, pp. 54-56.
